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1. A Puzzle and Two Questions 
The best theories of causation do a better job clarifying what it means to identify 
a cause than specifying what it means to pick out the cause that made the 
difference. For instance, counterfactual theories can explain what it means to say 
“Mary’s striking the match caused the match to light”, but they do not explain 
what it could mean to specify “Mary’s striking the match, rather than the presence 
of oxygen, caused the match to light.” Mary’s striking the match counts as a cause 
on counterfactual accounts because if Mary had not struck the match, then the 
match would not have lit. But the same reasoning leads to the conclusion that the 
presence of oxygen was also a cause; if oxygen had not been present, then the 
match would not have lit.1 There is no denying that oxygen was a real cause. 
Nevertheless, in ordinary contexts, observers would identify Mary’s striking the 
                                                
∗ Thanks to Jeff Barrett, Mark Borrello, Richard Creath, Norman Dahl, Richard Grandy, Bill 
Hanson, Susan Hawthorne, Toben Lafrancois, Roberta Millstein, Bart Moffat, Jane Maienschein, 
Sandy Mitchell, Katie Plaisance, Chuck Stieg, Marcel Weber, Beyong-Uk Yi, and especially to, 
Helen Longino, Jay Odenbaugh, Michael Strevens, Jim Woodward, and referees of this journal for 
constructive comments on various versions of this paper. 
1 Some might say that Mary’s striking the match is the “triggering cause” because it explains the 
timing of the event and that other causes, including the presence of oxygen, are “structural”. But 
this distinction breaks down under a counterfactual analysis of causation. For example, under a 
counterfactual analysis, the timing of the match lighting was also due to the fact that oxygen was 
not removed just before the match was struck and then reintroduced with a torch just after the 
match was struck. In this case, the match would have lit at a later time. Hence, one might argue 
that the timing of the match lighting was caused by such a series of events not occurring. The 
distinction between triggering and structural causes, or something much like it, can be sustained 
by analyzing it in terms of actual difference making causes, rather than mere causes. 
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match, and not the presence of oxygen, as the factor that made the difference. 
And in an important sense they would be right. The puzzle is, in what sense? 
There is a distinction to be drawn between identifying the causes of an actual 
phenomenon, such as the presence of oxygen, and picking out the cause that 
actually made the difference, such as Mary’s striking the match. This distinction is 
elusive, and it is tempting to dismiss it as illusory. On this view, there is an 
ontological difference between causes and non-causes, but there is no ontological 
difference among causes. This was the position taken by Mill who argued that the 
capricious manner in which we select causes from conditions indicates that there 
is no scientific ground for a distinction.2 Subsequent attempts to explain the 
selection of “the cause” from many causes (or from many “conditions”) have 
generally centered on interest-laden factors that depend on the context of inquiry. 
For example, Hart and Honoré’s say that the selection depends on principles that 
vary “both with the type of causal question at issue and the circumstances in 
which causal questions arise”3. As Mackie explained:  
. . . since even the choice of a field is relative to a purpose or a point of view, and 
since even apart from this what we recognize as a cause, rather than a mere 
condition, commonly depends on what we know – or what we knew first – or what 
is closely related to our interests, there is much to be said for Mill’s refusal to 
distinguish ‘philosophically speaking’ between causes and conditions. As an 
analysis of ordinary language, this would be wrong; but from a theoretical point of 
view, as an account of causal processes themselves, it would be right.”4  
Mackie’s claim has not been seriously challenged. According to the received 
philosophical wisdom, the causes we select as “the cause” are the causes that are 
most relevant to whatever interests we happen to have. Selected causes do not 
share some ontological feature that non-selected causes lack. What selected causes 
share is our interest. And our interests, as Hart and Honoré’s analysis of the 
contextual factors underlying the selection of causes reveals, vary from one 
epistemic context to the next. Ontologically speaking, causes are causes. This view 
suggests that seeking the one cause among many that actually made the difference 
would be a fool’s errand. Although this is the dominant view in the philosophical 
literature, it is difficult to sustain when attention is turned to scientists’ concrete 
efforts to identify which cause among a set of causes is actually making the 
difference. 
Nowhere is the practice of picking out actual difference makers more real 
than in biologists’ account of the role of DNA in the development and 
                                                
2 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, (New York, NY: Macmillan Press, 1950), p. 244. 
3 H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 31. 
4 J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 120. 
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functioning of cells and organisms. Biologists agree that DNA exercises its roles 
through the production of RNA and polypeptide molecules. Given the 
mechanisms of RNA and polypeptide syntheses, DNA is obviously a cause of 
linear sequences of nucleotides and amino acids comprising these molecules. But, 
just as obviously, DNA is only one of many causes. Although biologists and 
philosophers often talk as if DNA “produces” RNA and polypeptides, everyone 
knows that many different molecules and cellular structures play necessary roles 
in the in vivo syntheses of these important molecules. Even in the simplest case, 
the production of RNA molecules in prokaryotes, the syntheses causally depend 
on RNA polymerase. This has led some philosophers to argue for “parity” and 
against the “reductionistic bias” of biologists who center so much attention on 
the role of genes and DNA.5 But perhaps biologists are right, perhaps there is an 
ontological feature that distinguishes DNA as the actual difference maker. 
Determining whether biologists are right requires solving the conceptual puzzle 
about the difference between what it means to be a cause and what it means to be 
a cause that actually makes a difference.  The aim of this paper is to solve this 
conceptual puzzle and address two related questions about causal reasoning in 
biology.  
The first question concerns arguments for causal parity in complex biological 
systems. These arguments typically start with the premise that the kind of element 
emphasized by scientists as the cause of a given process is actually just one of 
many causes of the process. Parity arguments then claim that picking out one 
cause, when in fact there are many, cannot be justified on ontological grounds 
because, after all, causes are causes. Some proponents of parity acknowledge that 
picking out one cause among many might be a useful short-term heuristic.6 
Others argue that it represents an unjustifiable bias that “privileges” false 
reductive accounts of complex processes over true holistic ones.7 Either way, if 
the basic pattern of reasoning in parity arguments is sound, then picking out 
DNA as the actual difference making cause of the linear sequences of nucleotides 
in RNA and amino acids in polypeptides cannot be justified on ontological 
grounds. Biologists, however, have been quick to identify DNA (in most 
contexts) as the cause of these linear sequences. My first question about causal 
reasoning in biology is ‘does the existence of multiple causes in the complex 
processes of biological development imply that there cannot be an ontological 
difference that justifies focusing attention on genes and DNA?’ 
                                                
5 For a number of essays and references to essays arguing for “parity” see Susan Oyama, Paul E. 
Griffiths, and Russel D. Gray, eds., Cycles of Contingency, (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT 
Press, 2001). 
6 For example, see Susan Oyama, Evolution’s Eye (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000). 
7 For example, see Lenny Moss, What Genes Can’t Do (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT 
Press, 2003) and Jason Scott Roberts, Embryology, Epigenesis, and Evolution: Taking Development 
Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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The second question concerns how causal generalizations in biological 
sciences, such as molecular biology, differ from causal generalizations in many 
physical sciences. In physical sciences, investigators often prize causal 
generalizations that hold over as wide a range of conditions as possible. Indeed, 
many philosophers of science claim that physical scientists seek causal 
generalizations which hold over all possible conditions. There is an active debate 
concerning whether such universality is an appropriate ideal for physical sciences, 
but probably everyone, or at least nearly everyone, would concede that physical 
scientists are seldom satisfied with generalizations that do not hold under a wide 
variety of artificial and natural conditions and continuously seek generalizations 
with ever broader ranges of application.  Biologists are also concerned about the 
range of conditions under which their causal generalizations hold. But in contrast 
to physicists, they seem perfectly satisfied with causal generalizations that are highly 
sensitive (that is, those which do not hold over a wide range of conditions). Why 
is the ideal of universality so much less important to biologists than to physical 
scientists? Have biologists set their sights too low as some philosophers contend? 
And if these philosophers are wrong (as almost every philosopher of biology 
claims), that is, if universality is not an appropriate ideal for biological sciences, 
then what ideal is? My second question about causal reasoning in biology is, ‘what 
kind of causal generality matters in the context of biology?’  
I will solve the conceptual puzzle about actual difference making and address 
the questions about causal reasoning in biology by analyzing causal concepts that 
have not been adequately analyzed, namely, the concepts of potential difference 
maker, the actual difference maker, and an actual difference maker. These concepts, and 
my explications of them, are derivative in the sense that they presuppose an 
underlying notion of cause. My explications are based on James Woodward’s 
manipulability theory of causation, which provides a useful philosophical 
framework for getting clear about causal reasoning in science. I will not address 
the question of whether my analysis could be preserved under alternatives to this 
theory.  I contend, however, that if a theory of causation cannot preserve my 
analysis of the difference between actual versus potential difference making, then 
it cannot be adequate for understanding causal reasoning in biology.  
It is worth emphasizing that I will not claim that the selection of causes is 
always based on identifying actual difference makers. As I have said, Hart and 
Honoré’s analysis reveals factors behind the selection of causes that vary from 
one epistemic context to the next. But I will argue against the notion that all 
causes are on an ontological par. Some causes are actual difference makers while 
others are not (regardless of epistemic context), and solving the puzzle of what it 
is to be an actual difference maker provides a basis for shedding new light on 
causal reasoning in the sciences. I believe it can also shed light on the selection of 
causes more generally, but that is a topic for another occasion. 
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This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I examine causal reasoning in 
classical genetics to substantiate my claim that there is a genuine distinction 
between identifying a mere cause (a potential difference maker) and identifying 
the cause that makes the actual difference (the actual difference maker). In 
sections 3 and 4, I review the basics of Woodward’s manipulability theory and 
explain why his theory does not solve the puzzle about the difference between 
potential and actual difference makers. I formulate the concept of the actual 
difference maker in section 5. This concept, which is missing from Woodward’s 
account, explains why it made sense for classical geneticists (and continues to 
make sense for contemporary geneticists) to identify one gene as “the cause” of a 
particular phenotypic effect even though it was already known that many genes 
are involved in bringing about such an effect. In section 6, I explain how this 
analysis resolves the puzzle about what it means to identify one cause among 
many as the actual difference maker. I address the question about parity 
arguments, which requires specifying the concept of an actual difference maker as 
well invoking ideas about causal specificity in sections 7 and 8. Finally, in section 
9, I use my account of the ontology of difference makers to specify what kind of 
causal generality is relevant in biology. 
2. Genes as causes in classical genetics 
Classical geneticists routinely identified one gene as the cause of a particular 
phenotype while explicitly acknowledging that any phenotype was brought about 
by many genes, not just one. Hence, this science is a good place to begin 
investigating how it makes sense to identify one cause among many as the actual 
difference maker. The philosophical literature contains many inflated claims about 
the causal powers classical geneticists allegedly attributed to genes. It is sometimes 
said, for instance, that Morgan and his collaborators were preformationists and 
believed that genes were active causal agents that individually brought about 
distinctive phenotypes.8 One might try to substantiate such interpretations by 
searching for highly theoretical passages in which geneticists speculated on 
epigenesis or preformationism.9 But classical genetics was largely an experimental 
science, and we gain a better understanding of its basic causal reasoning by 
examining how geneticists explained their experimental results, not how they 
speculated about phenomena they could not actually explain.  
                                                
8 See Lenny Moss, What Genes Can’t Do (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT Press, 2003). 
9 Alternatively, one might perform a linguistic analysis of the terms (such as ‘gene action’) or a 
comparative analysis of metaphors (for example, see Evelyn Fox Keller, Century of the Gene 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). While such approaches identify biases of 
classical geneticists, they do not necessarily identify the concepts doing the work in explanations 
of concrete phenomena. My aim here is to reconstruct the reasoning that made the experimental 
science work in the laboratory and might reasonably be extended beyond the laboratory. 
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Experimentation in classical genetics involved carefully orchestrated breeding 
regimens that resulted in distinctive inheritance patterns.  Reasoning about these 
experiments invoked a conceptual division between the internal genetic make-up 
of an organism, called its genotype, and its outward character, called its phenotype. 
What classical geneticists explained were the inheritance patterns formed by the 
transmission of phenotypic differences from one generation to another. 
Geneticists explained these patterns by following the transmission of genotypic 
differences from generation to generation and attributing the presence of 
alternative phenotypic traits to the presence of alternative genotypes, that is, to 
the presence of alternative forms of genes. 
The classical mode of explanatory reasoning can be illustrated by examining a 
fragment of experimentation involving Morgan’s favored model organism, the 
fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. It is worth emphasizing that the mode of reasoning 
illustrated by this historical example is still an important mode of reasoning in 
genetics today. The experiment I examine below, reported in 1919, entailed 
breeding flies for several successive generations to produce distinctive inheritance 
patterns involving several different phenotypic traits, each of which was 
associated with a different gene. The basic aim of the experiment was to 
investigate the precise locations of the underlying genes with respect to one 
another. But it is not necessary for my purposes here to describe the investigative 
reasoning or the intricate explanation of the complex inheritance patterns 
involving the transmission of the several traits over half a dozen generations. It 
suffices to examine only the fragment of the explanation involving the 
transmission of one of the traits over a single generation. I will examine how 
Morgan explained the transmission of eye-color from one of the experimental 
generations to the next. 
The parental generation consisted of females with red eyes, the so-called 
“wild-type” character, and males with purple eyes, the mutant character. When 
these flies were crossed, all offspring had red eyes. So the resulting inheritance 
pattern was that red-eyed females crossed with purple-eyed males produced all 
red-eyed offspring. 
Explanations of inheritance patterns in classical genetics proceeded in two 
stages: the first stage accounted for the transmission of genes; the second stage 
explained the phenotypic appearances of offspring by drawing connections 
between genetic make-up and phenotypic appearance. 10 With regard to the first 
stage, geneticists identified two alleles of the purple gene: the wild-type allele, 
designated as “+”, and the mutant, purple allele, designated as “pr”. On the basis 
                                                
10 I describe this experiment more fully, establish the typicality of the explanatory reasoning 
examined here, and discuss the larger context of investigative reasoning in which this experiment 
was conducted in C. Kenneth Waters, “What Was Classical Genetics?”, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science, section A 35 (2004): 783-809. 
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of prior experiments, geneticists knew that the purple gene was located on 
chromosome II.  
The first stage of the explanation began with the premise, established on the 
basis of prior experiments (which yielded the flies used as parents in the cross 
discussed here), that the female parents were homozygous for the wild-type allele 
(+ / +) and that the male parents were homozygous for the purple allele (pr / pr). 
Each offspring received one copy of chromosome II from its mother and one 
copy from its father via the processes of meiosis and gamete combination.  The 
maternally derived chromosome II in every case must have contained the wild-
type allele (since both second-chromosomes of every female parent contained the 
wild-type allele) and the paternally derived chromosome II must have contained 
the purple allele (since both second-chromosomes of every male parent contained 
the purple allele).  Hence, all offspring were heterozygous (pr / +).  The genetic 
makeup of the progeny was thus explained by tracing the transmission of genes 
from parents to offspring, which marks the completion of the first stage of the 
explanation.   
The second stage of the explanation drew inferences about phenotypic 
appearances. The purple allele was known to be recessive to wild-type. This means 
that in relevant contexts, heterozygote flies (pr / +) have the same phenotypic 
appearance as flies homozygous for the wild-type allele. Since the offspring in this 
cross were all heterozygous, as explained by the first stage of this explanation, and 
since purple is recessive to wild-type in the context of this experiment, all 
offspring must have the wild-type character. This completed the explanation of 
the transmission of red-eye color from mothers to offspring.   
The explanatory reasoning here does not depend on identifying the material 
make-up, mode of action, or general function of the underlying purple gene. It 
depends only on the ideas that copies of the gene are located in chromosomes 
that are passed on from generation to generation and that the difference in the 
gene (that is, the difference between pr and +), whatever this difference is, causes 
the differences in phenotypes.11 The idea that the gene is the difference maker 
needs to be qualified: differences in the gene cause phenotypic differences in 
particular genetic and environmental contexts.   
Difference principle: differences in a gene cause uniform phenotypic 
differences in particular genetic and environmental contexts.  
                                                
11 For further argumentation on this point and the difference principle stated below, see C. 
Kenneth Waters, “Genes Made Molecular”, Philosophy of Science, 61 (1994), 163-185. Fred Gifford 
and Lisa Gannett also stress the importance of difference making in the context of genetics, see F. 
Gifford, “Genetic Trait” Biology and Philosophy, 5 (1990), 327-347 and L. Gannet "What's in a 
Cause? The Pragmatic Dimensions of Genetic Explanations", Biology & Philosophy 14 (1999), 349–
374. 
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The difference principle is easily applied to experimental contexts because 
geneticists deliberately simplified the causal situation by standardizing 
environmental conditions and removing genetic differences that might affect the 
phenotypes under study (other than the genetic differences being investigated in 
the experiment). Their strategy was to construct an experimental situation so that 
only those gene differences being investigated were causing differences in the 
phenotypic appearances under study.  
The fact that classical geneticists routinely constructed experimental situations 
so that the difference principle would apply undermines the notion that they 
naively believed that each of the phenotypic characters they studied were 
preformed in single genes or even gene complexes. They were well aware of the 
fact that differences in many different genes could affect any given trait, and they 
therefore set up their experiments so the difference in a particular phenotype 
would be caused by a difference in one gene (or a very few genes), not many. 
Notice that reasoning in this experimental context naturally invokes an 
ontological distinction between the general causes of a phenotypic trait (for 
example, eye color) and the cause of an actual difference in the trait (for example, 
the difference between red and purple eye color). Many genes are potential 
difference makers with respect to eye color, but in this experiment genes were 
controlled via breeding regimens so that only one of these genes (the purple gene) 
actually differed, and hence only one of these genes actually caused eye color to 
differ in the experiment.  
This interpretation, which invokes an ontological distinction between a cause 
and the actual difference making cause, is born out by Morgan’s own discussion 
of the causal relationship between genes and phenotypes.  Morgan, trained as an 
embryologist, distinguished between the point in development where geneticists 
typically observe a difference and the point at which the developmental process 
was altered to bring about the observed difference:  
. . .  the study of embryology shows that every organ of the body 
is the end-result, the culmination of a long series of processes. A 
change that affects any step in the process may be expected often 
to affect a change in end result. It is the final visible effect that we 
see, not the point at which the effect was brought about.12 
The next quotation shows, as my analysis implies, that Morgan did not presume a 
simplistic one-gene one-character type view. He was well aware that particular 
characters such as eye-color are caused by many different genes. He even 
speculated that every organ in the body might be affected by each and every gene 
in the organism’s genome: 
                                                
12 Thomas H. Morgan, The Theory of the Gene (New Haven, CT: Yale, 1926), p. 305–306. 
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Suppose, for instance, to take perhaps an extreme case, all the 
genes are instrumental in producing each organ of the body. This 
may only mean that they all produce chemical substances essential 
for the normal course of development. 13 
Now, the conceptual puzzle makes its appearance: 
If now one gene is changed so that it produces some substance 
different from that which it produced before, the end-result may 
be affected, and if the change affects one organ predominatingly 
[sic] it may appear the one gene alone has produced this effect. In 
a strictly causal sense this is true, but the effect is produced only in 
conjunction with all the other genes. In other words, they are all 
still contributing, as before, to the end-result which is different in 
so far as one of them is different.14 
This passages implies a distinction between two causal concepts. It emphasizes 
that the end result of development is affected by, that is, caused by, all the genes 
working in conjunction. But it also acknowledges that in another sense, in what 
Morgan called the “strictly causal sense”, “one gene alone has produced this 
effect.” Morgan’s unanalyzed distinction corresponds to the difference between 
what I am calling “a cause” and what I am calling “the actual difference making 
cause” (or “the actual difference maker”). His science entailed, as do biological 
sciences in general, identifying one or a few elements as the “actual cause(s)” in 
situations that necessarily involve many causes.  The problem of explaining what 
it means to pick out one cause among many as the actual difference maker is 
indeed a genuine philosophical puzzle.  
3. Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation and causal 
explanation 
Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation does not solve this puzzle, but it 
provides conceptual tools for constructing concepts of difference making that can 
explain what it means to pick out the actual difference maker. His theory is based 
on the idea that causal relationships involve patterns of counterfactual 
dependencies concerning what would happen if certain properties were 
manipulated. To say there is a causal relationship between two properties, on this 
account, is to say that one can change the value of one property by manipulating 
the other property. The idea that causal relationships are those that could be used 
for the purposes of manipulation have been developed by a number of scientists 
                                                
13 See previous footnote. 
14 See previous footnote.
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as well as philosophers.15 Philosophers developing this idea have generally tried to 
construct reductive theories of causation, that is, theories that describe causal 
relationships in non-causal terms. But Woodward, following the lead of scientists 
and statisticians, upon whose work he generously draws, does not aim to provide 
a reductive analysis of cause (as will become evident below). Instead, he assumes a 
basic counterfactual notion of cause, and then uses ideas about manipulations 
developed in the scientific and statistical literatures to construct a general theory 
about causal relationships and an account of various ways scientist reason about 
them.  
Although Woodward’s account includes interesting ideas about causal 
inference and explanation, I will not describe them here because my 
argumentation centers on ontological, not epistemological, considerations. In 
addition, I will not review how Woodward responds to various criticisms of 
manipulability theories. But it is worth pointing out that since Woodward’s theory 
is not reductive, it avoids difficulties that vex traditional manipulability theories of 
causation.16 
Woodward motivates the stress on manipulability by pointing out that human 
interest in causal relationships began with practical interests in manipulation and 
control. This motivation certainly resonates with the history of biology. A central 
theme in the history of experimental biology (and genetics in particular) is that 
persistent interest in manipulating and controlling life, both on the part of 
scientists and those providing scientists with resources, has exerted a tremendous 
impact on the course of research. Even in the cases of evolutionary biology and 
ecology, which are often pursued in non-experimental venues, research has often 
                                                
15 Prominent philosophical accounts include R. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1940),  D. Gasking: "Causation and Recipes", Mind, 64, (1955), 479–487, G. von 
Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971), and 
Menzies, P. and Price, H. "Causation as a Secondary Quality", British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, 44 (1993), 187–203. Accounts developed by non-philosophers include T. Cook and D. 
Campbell, D., Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1979), and J. Pearl, Causality. New York: Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2000). 
16 For example, a common criticism of manipulability accounts of causation is that by reducing 
statements about causal relationships to statements about the possibilities of changing effects by 
manipulating causes, they seem to assume that causes can in fact be manipulated. But Woodward’s 
theory makes no such assumption; rather, it assumes that there is a truth to the matter of what 
would happen if it were technologically (or otherwise) possible to manipulate the relevant 
properties and the properties were manipulated. On Woodward’s theory, nothing prevents reading 
both instances of ‘were’ in this sentence as possibly counter-to-fact. A critic might respond that 
with respect to some phenomena, such as quantum phenomena, the very notion of manipulation 
ceases to make sense. If this is indeed the case, then one might defend a manipulability theory like 
Woodward’s on the ground that quantum phenomena are (therefore) not causal. See note 16 for 
further discussion of how Woodward’s theory avoids, or critics might say “postpones”, difficulties 
confronting reductive theories of causation. 
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been inspired, even driven, by human interests in manipulation and control. 
Hence, even though Woodward developed his theory of causation largely in the 
context of physics and economics, the motivation for causal reasoning made 
salient by his theory is very relevant to causal reasoning in biology.  
Woodward, following the practice of many scientists and statisticians, takes 
the relata of causal relationships to be properties (rather than events). To say that 
there is a causal relationship between X and Y, on his account, is to say that X 
and Y are properties and that manipulating one property would change the other. 
Woodward conceives of causal relationships as relationships between variables, so 
he would express this idea by saying that the value of the effect variable, say Y, 
can be changed by manipulating the value of a causal variable, say X. Variables in 
this context designate properties that take on two or more mutually exclusive 
values. The variable of temperature, for example, designates a magnitude that can 
take values such as 20 degrees or 100 degrees and the phenotypic variable of eye-
color designates a property that can take on values such as red or purple. These 
values are possessed by or instantiated in particular entities. So, for example, the 
water in a kettle might be 20 degrees or the eyes of a fruit fly might be red. So, 
according to Woodward’s theory, causal relationships are relationships between 
values of distinct properties that can be represented as values of different 
variables. 
Roughly speaking, Woodward writes, a causal relationship exists between two 
variables, X and Y, when: 
for at least some individuals there is a possible manipulation of 
some value of X that they possess which, given other appropriate 
conditions (perhaps including manipulations that fix other 
variables distinct from X at certain values), will change the value 
of Y or the probability distribution of Y for those individuals.17 
The inclusion of the causal term ‘change’ in the above passage reflects the fact, 
already mentioned, that Woodward’s theory is not reductive. It does not account 
for cause in non-causal terms.18 It is a non-reductive, counterfactual theory, 
potentially consistent with different reductive theories, including counterfactual 
                                                
17 James Woodward, Making Things Happen (Oxford: Oxford, 2003), p. 40. 
18 Woodward’s theory, because it is not reductive, cannot solve certain fundamental puzzles about 
causation, including the problem of coincidence. Because the theory is not reductive, it contains 
no ultimate answer to those who would ask of the quoted passage: but what distinguishes the 
claim that the intervention in X changes the value of Y from the claim that the intervention was 
merely a coincidence? Woodward’s theory provides answers that are useful for understanding how 
to clarify causal ideas or empirically test them, but its answers presuppose a basic counterfactual 
notion of cause that is not itself explained. Insofar as puzzles relate directly to this notion, 
Woodward’s theory will not solve them. But this does not imply that his theory is false; rather, it 
reflects the fact that his theory is not reductive. 
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theories such as David Lewis’. While some metaphysicians will not be satisfied 
until they have a reductive theory, perhaps they would be willing to concede that 
Woodward’s theory provides a useful way to think about causes in the meantime. 
In any case, this is the modest premise upon which the analysis that follows is 
based. 
Two technical concepts are important for understanding the gist of 
Woodward’s theory: intervention and invariance. When Woodward refers to “a 
possible manipulation of X” he has in mind a special kind of manipulation. It is 
not the case that any manipulation of the value of X that subsequently changes 
the value of Y implies that that X causes Y.  For example, a manipulation of the 
thermometer reading brought about by decreasing temperature would change the 
phase state of water, but this does not mean that thermometer readings cause 
water to freeze. To say that the thermometer reading causes water to freeze is to 
say that a special kind of manipulation of the thermometer reading, a 
manipulation that did not independently affect other causal variables such as 
temperature, would change the phase state from liquid to solid. The technical 
term for the relevant kind of manipulation is “intervention”. A manipulation 
counts as an intervention on X with respect to Y if and only if the manipulation 
changes the value of X without changing, independently of the change in value of 
X, the value of any causes of Y.19 “X causes Y” means that an intervention on X 
with respect to Y would change the value of Y. Notice that Woodward’s account 
does not require that all interventions on X would change Y, and this brings us to 
the second technical concept of his theory: invariance. 
On Woodward’s account, causal relationships are not necessarily universal. X 
can cause Y even if intervening on the value of X within many ranges of the 
variables X and Y would not change the value of Y.  For example, there is a 
causal relationship between temperature and the phase state of water even though 
increasing the temperature of water from 22° C to 95° C will not change its phase 
state.  In addition, X can cause Y even if intervening on the value of X has no 
effect on the value of Y when the value of certain variables not identified in the 
expression ‘X causes Y’ is outside some range. For example, the claim that raising 
the temperature of water from 22° C to 100° C causes water to boil is not 
contradicted by the fact that increasing the temperature of water from 22° C to 
100° C will not change the phase state of water when the atmospheric pressure is 
significantly greater than standard atmospheric pressure. An advantage of 
Woodward’s theory is that it accounts for the intuitively plausible idea that 
scientists typically explain phenomena by identifying causal dependencies that do 
not obtain under all conditions. The thermodynamical explanation of why a flask 
of water boiled over the flame of a Bunsen burner does not depend on identifying 
                                                
19 This is my description of Woodward’s concept of intervention. He carefully sets out a technical 
definition that deals with subtleties that can be ignored for present purposes. 
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a totally invariant relationship. Identifying a change in water temperature as the 
cause of the change in phase state under the laboratory conditions suffices.  
Woodward says that scientists identify genuine causal relationships even 
though these relationships (for example, the ones specified in textbooks) are 
almost always “sensitive” to the values of variables that figure into the specified 
relationships and/or to the values of variables that do not figure into the specified 
relationships. According to his account, the expression ‘X causes Y’ just means 
there are at least two different values of X, x1 and x2, and at least one set of values for 
the variables specified in the expression and the variables not specified in the 
expression, such that if one intervened to change the value of variable X from x1 
to x2, the value of Y would change.  The invariance of a causal relationship 
concerns ranges of values under which the relationship holds. Since causal 
relationships can be sensitive to the values of many different variables, and since 
the sensitivity with respect to one variable can depend on the values of other 
variables, the relevant ‘ranges of values’ refers to a space (or set of spaces) in a n-
dimensional array of variables (where n is the number of variables to which the 
relationship X causes Y is sensitive). Hence, it is more accurate to speak of 
“spaces of invariance” than “a range of invariance.” 
According to this account, causal explanations in science cite causal 
relationships exhibiting various amounts of invariance. Any such relationship 
must be at least minimally invariant in the sense that it must hold for at least two 
different values of the causal variable (a very weak condition). And it may be 
maximally invariant in the sense that it holds for all values of all variables whether 
they explicitly figure into the specification of the causal relationship or not (a very 
strong condition). But scientific explanations typically cite causal relationships 
that fall somewhere between these two extremes. Woodward reserves the term 
‘law’ for maximally invariant causal relationships. A virtue of his account is that it 
explains what is special about scientific laws (that is, maximal invariance) without 
implying that this special feature is required for scientific explanation.  
Woodward’s theory provides a natural framework for expressing the causal 
relationships identified by classical geneticists. The difference principle, discussed 
in section 2, can be reformulated in terms of the manipulability theory: 
Differences in a gene cause uniform phenotypic differences in 
particular genetic and environmental contexts.  
⇓  
For at least some organisms, a manipulation of the form of a gene 
they possessed as a zygote, given other appropriate conditions 
(such as genetic background and environmental conditions), 
would change the phenotypes of those individuals. 
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This reformulation makes salient features of the causal relationship expressed by 
the difference principle that were crucial for the practice of classical genetics. 
Experimentation in classical genetics entailed controlling the genetic background 
and environmental conditions. Geneticists bred model organisms to “clean up” 
their genetic backgrounds so phenotypic effects of particular mutations would not 
be masked. They also standardized environmental conditions in the laboratory. 
These efforts resulted in regular and repeatable patterns of inheritance. 
Woodward’s theory emphasizes the fact that causal relationships, such as those 
expressed by the difference principle, are context sensitive.  
4. A lacuna in the manipulability theory  
Woodward’s theory provides insights concerning many philosophical questions 
about causation and causal explanations, but it does not solve the problem about 
what it means to pick out the cause that makes an actual difference.  This lacuna 
can be illustrated by returning to the experiment discussed in section 2. In this 
experiment, the purple gene (the gene that takes on one of two contrasting values, 
+ or pr) was identified as the cause of red eye-color in the offspring even though 
this phenotypic end-result was known to depend on a number of different genes 
and environmental factors. According to Woodward’s manipulability theory, the 
purple gene was indeed a cause because the eye color of offspring could have 
been manipulated by intervening on this gene (for example, by changing the + 
allele in heterozygous offspring embryos to a pr allele). This idea is an instantiation 
of the difference principle. 
For the offspring in the experiment, a manipulation of the 
maternally derived gene from + to pr, given other appropriate 
conditions (such as the genetic background and environment), 
would change the phenotypes of the offspring from red-eyed to 
purple-eyed.  
But Morgan and his collaborators knew that eye color could be manipulated by 
intervening on a number of different genes (by 1919 they had identified 
mutations in at least 16 different genes located at separate loci that affected eye 
color). For example, just as eye-color of the offspring in the experiment could 
have been manipulated by intervening on the purple gene, eye-color could have 
been manipulated by intervening on the vermilion gene (for example, by changing 
the wild-type alleles in the offspring, which were homozygous for the vermilion 
wild-type allele, to the vermilion mutant allele). Hence, according to Woodward’s 
theory, the vermilion gene was just as much a cause of red eye-color in these 
offspring as was the purple gene.20 So Woodward’s theory clarifies what it means 
                                                
20 Readers might think this problem could be easily resolved since the vermilion mutation results 
in a different phenotype than that the purple mutation. But there are other examples where 
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to identify the purple gene as a cause of red eyes, but it implies that the vermilion 
gene is just as much a cause. 
Woodward tries to address the issue of why some causal factors are more 
significant in particular cases than others when he discusses token causation, 
where the problem is to pick out “the cause” of a single event.21 But Woodward’s 
analysis of token causation, which he presents only tentatively, does not provide a 
basis for elucidating the “strict” sense of cause that Morgan alluded to when he 
wrote:  “it may appear the one gene alone has produced this effect. In a strictly 
causal sense this is true, but the effect is produced only in conjunction with all the 
other genes.”22  
5. The concept of the actual difference maker 
The concept missing from Woodward’s theory of cause and causal explanation, 
and indeed missing from the philosophical literature in general, is that of an actual 
difference making cause. This concept captures Morgan’s “strict” sense of cause, 
the sense in which the purple gene, and not the vermilion gene, was “the cause” 
of eye-color in the experiment. Causation is often thought of as difference 
making. What is typically overlooked, however, is the fact that in order for there 
to be a difference maker there must be a difference. And in order for there to be 
an actual difference maker, there must be an actual difference. This raises the 
question: an actual difference among what things? The actual difference might be 
a difference among different entities, that is, among different actual entities, or it 
might be a difference in the same entity at different actual times.  
The first step in identifying an actual difference making cause, or an actual 
difference maker, is to specify an actual difference among actual entities (or an 
actual difference in the same entity at different actual times). If there is no actual 
difference, then there is no actual difference maker. In the classical genetics 
experiment discussed earlier, there was an actual difference; it was a difference in 
eye color among mother, father, and offspring flies in the experiment. The actual 
                                                                                                                            
different mutations (or different combinations of mutations) bring about phenotypic effects that 
are indistinguishable from one another. My account will explain why, in even these cases, it can 
make sense to say that one gene and not the other (or one set of genes and not the other set) is 
the actual difference maker. 
21 See Woodward, Making Things Happen (Oxford: Oxford, 2003), pp. 74–86). 
22 Quoted from Thomas H. Morgan, The Theory of the Gene (New Haven, CT: Yale, 1926), p. 305–
306. Woodward takes readers through a complicated attempt to deal with examples of actual 
causation, which fails because he tries to identify “the” in the context of singleton causal events. I 
discuss the problem with such attempts later in this paper. My aim here is to show that the 
problem of picking out the actual difference making cause arises within his theoretical framework. I 
prefer to offer a solution within his framework that works rather than present a detailed argument 
about why his tentative analysis of a similar problem will not do the job. 
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difference maker was the purple gene because it was the cause that actually 
differed and whose difference led to the actual difference in eye color (red versus 
purple).  The other genes, including the vermilion gene, were causes, but they 
were not actual difference makers in the experimental population of flies. The 
other genes that cause differences in eye color could not have been actual 
difference makers in the experimental population for the simple reason that they 
did not actually differ and hence it was not differences in them that brought about 
the actual differences in the population. 
The concept of the actual difference maker can be specified as follows.   
X is the actual difference maker with respect to Y in population p if and only if 
i. X causes Y (in the sense of Woodward’s manipulability theory). 
ii. The value of Y actually varies among individuals in p. 
iii. The relationship expressed by ‘X causes Y’ is invariant with 
respect to the variables that actually vary in p (over the spaces of 
values those variables actually take in p). 
iv. Actual variation in the value of X fully accounts for the actual 
variation of Y values in population p (via the relationship X causes 
Y).  
Notice that this concept applies only to causes in actual populations. It 
makes no sense to identify something as the actual difference maker without 
identifying either a population with at least two entities that actually differ with 
respect to the effect variable Y or a population of one or more entities that 
exhibit different Y values at different actual times. It is worth stressing that the 
actual effect is not a single property in a single token, it is a difference of a 
property in a population.23 
Woodward’s theory provides the tools to specify condition iv more fully. 
Consider what it means to say, for instance, that variations in the purple gene fully 
accounted for the actual variation in red versus purple eye color in the 
experimental population. It means that the phenotypic value was a function of the 
genotypic value in this population and that the generalization ‘X causes Y’ 
produced the correlation.  Or more concretely: (a) there was an actual difference 
in eye color among flies in the population; (b) flies in the population with the 
same genotypic values (with respect to this gene) had the same eye color; and (c) 
if the flies in the experiment had been intervened on such that they all had the 
                                                
23 I am using “population” in a statistical rather than biological sense: a population is either a set 
of entities or possibly the set of instances of an entity at different times. 
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same genotypic value (either + / +, + / pr or pr / pr), then this difference in eye 
color would not have existed. Or more generally: 
Actual variation in the value of X fully accounts for the actual variation of Y 
values in population p (via the generalization ‘X causes Y’) if and only if 
conditions i – iii above hold and 
(a) Individuals with the same X values in p have the same Y 
values. 
 (b) An intervention on X with respect to Y that changed the X 
value of all individuals in p to the X value that one and the same 
individual had sans intervention would change Y values in p such 
that they no longer differed.  
(c) There is no variable Z, distinct from X, such that an 
intervention on Z with respect to Y that changed Z values in one 
or more individuals in p to the Z value that one of the individuals 
had sans intervention would change Y values in p.  
6. Solving the puzzle about what it means for one cause among 
many to be the actual difference maker 
The concept of the actual difference maker clarifies the idea that there is an 
ontological difference between being a cause and being the cause that actually 
made a difference. Being a cause only entails that something is a potential 
difference maker, not the actual difference maker. To be a potential difference maker, 
that is, to be a causal variable, it suffices to satisfy the counterfactual patterns 
specified by the manipulability theory. It does not matter whether the causal 
variable actually varies in any actual population and whether this variation brings 
about actual differences. But to be the actual difference making cause of an actual 
difference in a population, the value of the variable must actually differ and this 
variation must bring about the actual differences among the entities in the 
population.  This is how to make sense of the idea, invoked by Morgan, that it is 
one thing to be a cause and another thing to be the cause strictly speaking. 
Seeking the one cause among many that actually made the difference is no fool’s 
errand. It entails picking out the actual difference maker among potential 
difference makers in an actual population. The philosophical puzzle with which 
we began is solved. 
In fact, the puzzle with which we began does not seem to be much of a puzzle at 
all. Picking out the actual difference making causes among many causes simply 
involves picking out the causes that actually differ and whose differences account 
for the actual differences of interest. It turns out that what makes the conceptual 
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situation puzzling is not so much a puzzling concept, but puzzling applications, 
such as the application with which I began, the lighting of the match. To apply 
the concept to this situation, to say that Mary’s striking the match is the actual 
difference making cause whereas the presence of oxygen was merely a cause, 
requires identifying an actual difference in an actual population. If Mary took the 
match from a box, then the matches contained in the box were an actual 
population and the difference between having lit versus not having lit was an 
actual difference. With respect to this actual effect (that is, the actual difference in 
this actual population), it is obvious that Mary’s striking the match was the actual 
difference making cause and that the presence of oxygen was merely a cause. The 
presence of oxygen was not the cause that made the actual difference in this 
actual population of matches because, after all, oxygen was present for all the 
matches.24  
Before proceeding to the next section, which considers more complex causal 
situations, it is helpful to consider two possible objections, one concerning 
whether my resolution of the puzzle is ontological, and the other concerning my 
use of the terms ‘actual’ and ‘potential’.  Readers might question whether this 
account identifies an ontological feature. After all, the selection of a difference 
making cause depends on the prior identification of a population. Can 
populations be identified, or specified, independently of our interest? If not, then 
applying the distinction between potential and actual difference makers seems to 
depend on more than ontology. But this line of questioning conflates the 
identification of a cause with the specification of an effect. Of course, being 
interested in one effect rather than another depends on more than the ontology 
of causal processes. Our interests lead us to inquire about the causes of some 
things and not others. The question here is whether the cause(s) of an effect are 
fixed by ontology. This account of difference making takes an effect to be an 
actual difference in an actual population. My claim is that the subset of causes that 
are the actual difference makers of such an effect is fixed entirely by the ontology 
of causation in the actual population, not by a mix of ontology and interests as 
recent writers have maintained.25 This is not to say that the selection of some 
causes among many is not based on interest or that it is based on a universal 
interest to pick out actual difference makers. But interests often are based on an 
interest to pick out actual difference makers in one or another actual population, 
and when they are, the issue reduces to ontology: the variety of epistemic factors 
detailed by Hart and Honoré are irrelevant and the features of real populations 
specified in this analysis determine which causes are the actual difference makers.  
                                                
24 This analysis might be extended to singleton cases as well.  If there were no other matches, then 
one could consider the effect to be the difference in the population made up of instances of the 
match before, during, and immediately after it was struck. 
25 Even Jonathan Schaffer, who comes closest to offering an ontological account, appeals to 
pragmatic factors to resolve the selection problem. See J. Schaffer, “Contrastive Causation,” 
Philosophical Review 114 (2005), 297–328. 
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The error of this possible objection is to infer from the fact that the selection of 
effect in an epistemic context involves pragmatics to the mistaken idea that what 
counts as the cause of that effect must also depend on pragmatics. My point is 
that once the effect is fully specified as an actual difference in a real population, 
the issue of which causes are the actual difference makers is an ontological one.  
Readers might also object that my use of the terms ‘actual’ and ‘potential’ is 
misleading because all causes, even what I call potential difference making causes, 
are actual in the sense that the actual differences causally depend on them. It is 
easiest to clarify this point by using the terminology of variables. An actual effect, 
on my account, is the actual difference in values of an effect variable in an actual 
population.  In the situations examined thus far, one causal variable plays a 
differentiating role in the sense that actual differences in its value explain the 
actual differences in values of the effect variable. Other causal variables do not 
play this role because they exhibit uniform values in the actual population. They 
are, however, potential difference makers because if, counter to fact, their values 
varied in the population then this variation could result in an increase in the 
differentiation of the values of the effect variable. In addition, however, a 
counter-to-fact variation in the values of a potential difference making variable 
might result in a reduction of the differentiation of the values of the effect 
variable (compared to the values of this variable in the actual population). Hence, 
the difference in values of the effect variable in the actual population depends not 
just on the different values taken by what I’m calling the actual difference making 
variable, but also on the uniform values taken by what I’m calling the potential 
difference making variables. So, one might say all causal variables are “actual” 
difference makers in the sense that the actual differences depend on all their 
values. Nevertheless, the fact that the values of some causal variables actually 
differ and the values of other variables do not is a feature of the causal structure 
of an actual population. I am choosing to reserve ‘actual’ to designate the causal 
variables whose values actually differ and ‘potential’ to designate the causal 
variables whose values do not actually differ. This terminology comes very 
naturally in the contexts of causal reasoning in the special sciences, which will 
become evident when we turn our attention to the complex biological processes 
such as development.  
In summary, the key to solving the conceptual puzzle, the key to 
understanding what it means to select an actual difference making cause from a 
plethora of mere causes, is to see that the selection involves picking out the causal 
property, differences in which produce an actual difference in a population. 
7. The concept of an actual difference maker 
In many biological situations, there is not just one actual difference maker, there 
are many. That is, actual variations in two or more variables in an actual 
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population account for actual differences in an effect variable. In such situations, 
the operative concept is an actual difference maker, not the actual difference 
maker. 
X is an actual difference maker with respect to Y in population p if and only if 
i. X causes Y.  
ii. The value of Y actually varies among individuals in p. 
iii. The relationship X causes Y is invariant over at least parts of 
the space(s) of values that other variables actually take in p.  (In 
other words, it is invariant with respect to a portion of the 
combinations of values the variables actually take in p.) 
iv. Actual variation in the value of X partially accounts for the 
actual variation of Y values in population p (via the relationship X 
causes Y). 
As in the case of the actual difference maker concept, the fourth condition in this 
construction can be specified by using Woodward’s concept of intervention.  
X partially accounts for the actual variation of Y values in population p (via the 
relationship X causes Y) if and only if conditions i – iii above are 
satisfied and 
An intervention on X with respect to Y that changed the X values 
in one or more individuals in p to the X value that one of the 
individuals had sans intervention would change Y values in p.  
The statistical relationship between X and Y values in the case of an actual 
difference maker is far messier than in the case of the actual difference maker. In 
the latter case, the value of Y is a function of X. But in the case of an actual 
difference maker, the individuals in the population with the same X value might 
have different Y values.  
The causal relationship underlying an actual difference maker claim is also 
more complicated. In the case of the actual difference maker, eliminating the 
variation in X values (by intervening on X with respect to Y in p) would eliminate 
the variation in Y values. In the case of an actual difference maker, eliminating the 
variation in X values (by intervening on X with respect to Y in p) does not 
necessarily eliminate the variation in Y values. It only changes the variation in Y 
values. In fact, eliminating the variation in the value of an actual difference maker 
might actually increase, rather than decrease, variation in the value of Y in p. So, it 
would be more accurate to use the term “an actual difference maker” with “an 
actual difference changer” and to specify that an actual different changer might be 
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“an actual difference increaser” or “an actual difference reducer” in the 
population.  This fine conceptual point has important implications in real science, 
for example, in quantitative genetics. 
Quantitative genetics involves a number of subtleties of actual difference 
making. While analyzing these subtleties is a topic for another paper, some 
intuitively plausible connections between actual difference making relationships in 
different populations can be specified quickly. Suppose there are three 
populations, p1, p2, and p3, that p1 and p2 are mutually exclusive, and that p1 is a 
proper subset of p3. If X is the actual difference maker with respect to Y in p1, it 
is not necessarily the actual difference maker with respect to Y in p2. In fact, it is 
not necessarily an actual difference maker with respect to Y in p2.  But if X is the 
actual difference maker in population p1, then X is at least an actual difference 
maker in p3. Furthermore, if X is an actual difference maker in p1, then it is not 
necessarily an actual difference maker in p2, but it is necessarily an actual 
difference maker in p3.  
8. Does the existence of multiple causes indicate that there is no 
ontological basis for centering attention on genes and DNA? 
My solution to the conceptual puzzle about the difference between what it means 
to be a cause and what it means to make an actual difference reveals the fallacy of 
causal parity arguments. The fact that there are many causes does imply that there 
is ontological parity among them. DNA is one cause among many, but in some 
contexts it might be the actual difference maker while other causes are only 
potential difference makers. My aim in this section is to identify situations in 
which DNA is an ontologically distinctive cause, and to clarify the nature of its 
causal distinctiveness in these situations.  It turns out that understanding why 
DNA is a distinctive cause requires invoking a concept of causal specificity as well 
as concepts of actual difference making.  
As readers will see, the situation I identify is a small part of the developmental 
process and hence my analysis does not provide the basis for making sweeping 
claims against all theses of causal parity. But by challenging the basic logic of 
causal parity arguments, and by showing that parity breaks down in certain 
contexts, my account reveals important clues for understanding why so much 
research attention in developmental biology is centered on DNA.26 
                                                
26 Other aspects relevant to a fuller account of this issue are in C. Kenneth Waters, “What Was 
Classical Genetics”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, section A 35 (2004): 783–809, Waters, 
“A Pluralist Interpretation of Gene-centered Biology” in Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and C. 
Kenneth Waters, eds., Scientific Pluralism, volume XIX of the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, (2006), 190–214, and Waters “Beyond Theoretical 
 Causes that make a difference C. K. Waters 22 
Recall that the first step for identifying the (or an) actual difference maker is 
identifying an actual difference in an actual population. An important actual 
difference in cells is the difference in the nucleotide sequences of RNA molecules 
synthesized in a cell. This is not the only important actual difference in a cell, but 
it is an important difference. Consider a relatively simple example, the population 
of RNA molecules synthesized in a bacterium.  Synthesis of any RNA molecule in 
a bacterium depends on the presence of an activated gene (a segment of 
nucleotides in a DNA molecule), RNA polymerase, and several additional 
accessory proteins. All of these molecules are causes, so they are all potential 
difference makers. Intervening on any of the activated DNA segments could alter 
the sequence of nucleotides in the resulting RNA molecules, and intervening on 
any of the others (for example, RNA polymerase) could stop RNA synthesis 
altogether. They are all potential difference makers.  
But only the activated DNA segments (the genes) are actual difference makers 
of RNA sequences in a bacterium. Let G be the variable representing the 
nucleotide sequences in the activated genes, P be the variable representing the 
structure of RNA polymerase molecules, P1 – Pn designate variables representing 
structures for each of the accessory proteins, and R designate the variable 
representing the nucleotide sequences in the RNA molecules. Each of the 
variables G, P, P1, . . . Pn represent causes of R, so each satisfies the first condition 
for being the actual difference maker. But among these potential difference 
makers, only G takes on different values. Hence, only G satisfies the second 
condition for being the actual difference maker. Since the other variables do not 
take on different values, the causal relationship between G and R is invariant with 
respect to the differences in the bacterial cell. So the third condition for being the 
actual difference maker is satisfied. Furthermore, actual variation in the value of G 
completely accounts for actual variation in R values in the sense spelled out in the 
fourth condition of the actual difference maker concept. That is, individual RNA 
molecules synthesized from the same gene have the same R values and if the 
activated genes in the cell had been intervened on so that each had the same G 
value (the same nucleotide sequence), then the synthesized RNA molecules would 
have had the same R value as well (the same nucleotide sequence). With respect 
to the differences in the linear sequences of the population of RNA molecules in 
a bacterial cell, current evidence indicates that DNA is the actual difference 
making cause.  
RNA synthesis in eukaryotic cells is more complicated. It involves three 
different kinds of RNA polymerase molecules and many dozens of accessory 
proteins. The different kinds of polymerase molecules are involved with the 
                                                                                                                            
Reductionism and Layer-cake Antireductionism: How DNA Retooled Genetics and Transformed 
Biological Practice”, forthcoming in Michael Ruse and David Hull (eds.) Oxford Handbook to the 
Philosophy of Biology. 
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synthesis of different classes of RNA molecules (for example, RNA polymerase I 
catalyzes the synthesis of rRNA and RNA polymerase II catalyzes the synthesis of 
mRNA). Presumably, different accessory molecules are also associated with the 
synthesis of different RNA molecules. In this situation, DNA is not the only 
actual difference maker because it is not the only cause that actually differs among 
the synthesis events in a cell. For example, consider the difference in linear 
structures of the population of mRNA and rRNA molecules in a eukaryotic cell. 
The genes involved in the syntheses differ, but so do the RNA polymerases. 
Intervening on polymerase II could stop synthesis of mRNA altogether, and this 
would affect the structures of the resulting RNA molecules. Intervening on 
polymerase I could have a parallel effect, as could intervening on accessory 
molecules.  Hence, DNA is an actual difference maker, not the actual difference 
maker. RNA polymerase and accessory proteins could also be actual difference 
makers. Nevertheless, many other background constituents necessary for the 
synthesis to occur (for example, water) do not differ. So the logic of the parity 
argument does not hold. But this does not fully resolve the issue about parity 
because the different actual difference making causes, say genes versus 
polymerases, do not seem to be on an ontological par. 
Further resolution of the alleged parity requires an additional causal concept, 
one of causal specificity. The concept I have in mind is similar to Lewis’ concept 
of causal influence, and can be sketched by example.27 DNA is a specific difference 
maker in the sense that different changes in the sequence of nucleotides in DNA 
would change the linear sequence in RNA molecules in many different and very 
specific ways. RNA polymerase does not have this specificity. Intervening on 
RNA polymerase might slow down or stop synthesis of a broad class of RNA 
molecules, but it is not the case that many different kinds of interventions on 
RNA polymerase would change the linear sequence in RNA molecules in many 
different and very specific ways. This shows that DNA is a causally specific 
potential difference maker. The fact that many such differences in DNA do 
actually exist and these differences actually explain the specific differences among 
RNA molecules indicates that DNA is the causally specific actual difference 
maker with respect to the population of RNA molecules first synthesized in 
eukaryotic cells.  
As readers familiar with contemporary molecular biology know, RNA 
production in eukaryotes is often complicated by processes that change RNA 
molecules after they are synthesized. If we consider the wider population of RNA 
molecules in a eukaryotic cell (not the subset of those first synthesized), then we 
need to consider processes such as RNA splicing. RNA splicing changes the 
                                                
27 David Lewis, “Causation as Influence”, Journal of Philosophy, XCVII (97), no. 4, (April 2000): 
182–97. Conversations with Chris Hitchcock and Jim Woodward helped me to develop this idea. 
Woodward points out that my ideas about causal specificity had a lot in common with Lewis’s 
ideas about causal influence. 
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linear sequence of an RNA molecule by removing certain internal segments in the 
RNA molecule and ‘splicing’ the remaining pieces together. RNA splicing is 
causally specific. Often, one and the same RNA molecule is spliced in different 
ways by different splicing agents. In these situations, the splicing agents are 
causally specific actual difference makers. They actually differ and the actual 
differences lead to specific changes in the nucleotide sequence of the mature 
DNA molecule. In the production of these molecules, DNA is not the only 
causally specific actual difference maker.28 We might say that the structure of 
these mature RNA molecules are determined by DNA (that is, the activated gene) 
and the splicing agent. In the case of RNA synthesis in eukaryotes the problem of 
causal parity is resolved, not by showing that DNA is the only causally specific 
actual difference maker, but by showing that it is one of a several.29 
Explanations in molecular biology do not rest on the premise that genes are 
the only causally specific actual difference makers with respect to the linear 
sequence of nucleotides in primary RNA, processed RNA, and polypeptides, but 
they do deny the idea that all causal factors involved in the production of RNA 
and polypeptide molecules are on a causal par. Such a parity thesis is false.  If 
true, it would indicate that emphasizing DNA and splicing agents in explanations 
of mRNA synthesis has no ontological basis. But current evidence indicates 
otherwise. The initial synthesis of RNA in prokaryotes and eukaryotes involves 
many causes including polymerases and accessory proteins, but only DNA is the 
causally specific actual difference maker. Apparently that is the end of the story 
for prokaryotes. In eukaryotes, some very important RNA molecules (and 
perhaps many) are differentially processed, so splicing agents are also causally 
specific actual difference makers. The linear sequence of nucleotides in mRNA 
are determined by the linear sequence of nucleotides in DNA, and in cases of 
differential splicing also by other molecules such as alternative splicing agents.30 
9. What kind of causal generality matters in biology? 
Biologists seek a special kind of generality in causal statements. Whereas physical 
scientists often try to establish generalizations that express causal relationships 
that hold over conditions that have not and will not be actualized (to their 
knowledge), biologists typically care only about whether a relationship holds 
                                                
28 But as Marcel Weber has pointed out to me, DNA has a greater degree of causal specificity than 
the other actual difference makers. 
29 I have limited discussion here to one of the apparently several kinds of causally specific actual 
difference makers involved with the synthesis of RNA in eukaryotes.  Discussing more examples 
would simply belabor my philosophical point that not all causes are on a par because some are 
causally specific actual difference makers (for example, genes and splicing agents) and others are 
not (for example, RNA polymerases I and III). 
30 See previous footnote. 
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under conditions actualized in organisms and their environments (or in the 
laboratory).31 Biologists do not care whether causal generalizations linking 
sequences in mRNA to sequences in polypeptides in the causal processes of 
polypeptide synthesis would still hold if the cellular conditions were quite 
different than cellular conditions actually are. For instance, if the form of tRNA 
molecules were different, then an mRNA molecule that now causes a particular 
amino acid sequence would cause a very different amino acid sequence. The fact 
that different tRNA could render the current causal generalizations about 
polypeptide synthesis false does not matter to biologists unless different tRNA 
has actually existed or is likely to actually exist in the future. We are now in a 
position to clarify the kind of causal generality that matters in biology. 
The difference can be articulated in terms of invariance space. Recall that a 
causal relationship is not necessarily maximally invariant; it can hold under some 
combinations of variable values and not under others. I introduced the term 
invariance space to refer to the set of value combinations under which a causal 
relationship holds. The observation mentioned above can be expressed this way: 
physical scientists often aim to identify causal relationships whose invariance 
space includes combinations of variable values that are not, as far as humans 
know, ever actualized. The fact that a portion of invariance space is never 
occupied does not seem to render the question of whether the relationship holds 
in that portion of invariance space less interesting or important in fundamental 
physics. But in the case of biology, the fact that a combination of variable values 
is never actualized does render the question of whether a relationship holds under 
that set of variable values less interesting and perhaps even altogether irrelevant. 
Consider the variable of tRNA forms. If the values of this variable were different 
than they actually are, that is, if actual tRNA molecules had different forms than 
they actually have, then the causal generalizations associating sequences in RNA 
and sequences in polypeptides could be strikingly different. And biologists are 
intensely interested in whether the values of this variable actually differ in certain 
mitochondria and chloroplast organelles. But if the values do not actually differ, 
then it does not much matter to biologists whether the invariance space of their 
generalizations include the non-actualized values.  
The reason biologists do not care whether the invariance space of a causal 
relationship includes combinations of variable values that are not actualized is 
because they are much more interested in the actual than the possible. Biologists 
are more interested in explaining actual differences than possible differences, and 
explaining actual changes over developmental and evolutionary time than possible 
differences. This is why they are more interested in identifying actual difference 
                                                
31 This claim needs to be qualified. Biologists interests in manipulating causal processes in 
organisms sometimes motivates them to seek causal generalizations that hold under conditions 
that could be artificially brought about in organisms and their environments. See final paragraph in 
this section. 
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makers than potential difference makers.32 This also explains why they are 
satisfied with highly sensitive causal generalizations about actual difference 
makers. Whether a property is an actual difference maker depends on whether it 
makes the difference under the conditions that actually obtain in the actual 
biological world. Whether it would make that difference if the conditions were 
different is irrelevant to understanding the difference the property makes in the 
actual world. Hence, seeking causal generalizations that are invariant over 
combinations of variable values that have not existed will not, directly at least, 
further the project of identifying the causal relationships relevant to explaining the 
actual differences in nature or the actual changes in complex biological processes 
such as ontological development. 
The last claim is qualified (“directly at least”) because biologists’ interests 
include manipulating biological entities. This interest stems not just from the 
motivation to improve conditions for humans (for example, to cure diseases, to 
increase agricultural yields, to enhance the aesthetic value of plants and animals), 
but also from the motivation to investigate processes and mechanisms in living 
systems. A chief strategy of investigation in biology is to manipulate basic 
biological processes and mechanisms to learn how they work.33 Hence, it is 
relevant whether causal generalizations will hold under conditions that could be 
made actual even if they are not currently actual. With this important qualification 
in mind, we can say that with respect to the goal of explaining the processes of 
life such as physiological functioning, ontological development, and evolutionary 
change, it is irrelevant whether the specified causal relationships extend to 
invariance spaces that include non-actualized combinations of variable values. 
This explains why biologists’ interest in the actual leads them to be perfectly 
satisfied with causal generalizations that are highly sensitive even if physical 
scientists are not.  
10. Conclusion 
The philosophical literature on causation includes attempts to bring one or 
another theory of causation into accord with intuitions about what was “the 
cause” of an event. The literature seems to take it for granted that our intuitions 
                                                
32 I thank Michael Strevens for emphasizing the idea that biologists are interested in actual 
difference making because they are interested in the actual, and not the other way around. 
33 See C. Kenneth Waters, “What Was Classical Genetics”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 
section A 35 (2004): 783–809, Waters, “A Pluralist Interpretation of Gene-centered Biology” in 
Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and Waters, eds., Scientific Pluralism, volume XIX of the Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), and Waters, 
“Beyond Theoretical Reductionism and Layer-cake Antireductionism: How DNA Retooled 
Genetics and Transformed Biological Practice” forthcoming in Michael Ruse and David Hull 
(eds.) Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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are distinguishing causes from non-causes.  But the analysis of this paper suggests 
that intuitions about what was “the cause” in an actual situation might stem from 
a natural inclination to pick out actual difference making causes, not an inclination 
to pick out causes simpliciter. Psychological research on causal reasoning in 
humans supports this idea. Recent empirical findings indicate that which factors 
are picked out as causes is indeed influenced by whether a candidate causal 
variable actually takes different values in the entities under observation.34 The 
possible relevance of actual variation in the values of causal variables goes 
unnoticed in the philosophical literature when effects such as the lighting of a 
match are described as a singular actual outcome in a singleton rather than as a 
difference in actual outcomes in a multiplicity. Hence, the ontological contexts in 
which the actual difference making causes are actually making a difference are 
removed from consideration and it is therefore impossible to identify which cause 
is the actual difference making cause. Our intuitive judgments about what cause is 
making an actual difference ends up being based on tacit hunches about what is 
missing from the descriptions.  If biologists were similarly limited to considering 
the causal synthesis of a single polypeptide molecule, they would have no basis 
for saying that the polypeptide’s linear sequence was determined by DNA, and 
not by RNA polymerase. In fact, if restricted to considering a single instance (or a 
population of identical outcomes), it might appear that DNA was merely 
scaffolding for the synthesis of RNA. The causal distinctiveness of DNA is in the 
population. It is only in the context where polypeptide molecules with different 
amino acid sequences are being synthesized that it makes sense for biologists to 
say that DNA is not on a causal par with many of the other molecules that play 
causally necessary roles in the synthesis of RNA and polypeptides. Likewise, I 
suspect, focusing attention on singleton situations about a single lighting of a 
match, a single breaking of a vase, or the single catastrophic dropping of a 
boulder obscures important features of causation.  Much light could be shed on 
causal reasoning by shifting attention to causes in populations. 
                                                
34 Patricia W. Cheng, “From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory”, Psychological 
Review 104, No. 2 (1997): 367–405. 
